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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
November 24, 1982 Conference 







Cert to Cal. Ct. App. 
(McDaniel) (order) 
State/Civil 
1. SUMMARY: Petr challenges the exclusion 
lie from voir dire proceedings in a capital case and 
of the transcript of 
Timely 
- 2 -
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Petr, a newspaper pub-
lisher, sought to cover the voir dire stage of a rape-murder tri-
al. The trial judge (Mortland) denied the petr's motion to 
openthe proceedings to the public. After voir dire, he denied a 
motion for access to the transcript, reasoning that the jurors' 
right to privacy and the right to a fair trial prevailed over the 
right of the public to know. Both the prosecution and the de-
fense favored denial of access to the public. The Ct. App. de-
nied a writ of mandate, and the state S.Ct. denied review. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that the voir dire pro-
ceeding is an integral part of the trial process and Globe News-
paper Co v. Superior Court, No. 81-611, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Virginia, 448 US 555 (1980), and Gannett Company, Inc. v. 
DePasquale, 443 US 368 (1979), recognize the independent interest 
of the public in a public trial. Allowing the trier of fact to 
be selected in secret proceedings endangers the entire judicial 
process, according to petr, by casting suspicion on the judicia-
ry. 
The California S.Ct. decided in Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 
P.2d 1301 (Cal. 1980), that jurors were influenced by hearing the 
death qualification phase of voir dire of other veniremen. It 
held, 
In order to m1n1m1ze potentially prejudicial 
effects identified by the Haney study, this 
court declares, pursuant to its supervisory 
authority over California criminal procedure, 
that in future capital cases that portion of 
the voir dire of each prospective juror which 
deals with issues which involve death-
- ,j -
qualifying the jury should be done individ-
ually and in sequestration. 
Id. at 1354. According to petr, the rule of Hovey is an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint on the exercise of the First Amend-
ment right of the public to an open trial. Further, it is uncon-
sti tu tionally vague and overbroad~ the state trial courts have 
given it a number of different interpretations. 
4. DISCUSSION: The petr was also the petr in Press-
Enterprise Co. v. San Diego Superior Court, No. 81-1022, in which 
cert was denied last Term. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
O'Connor would have granted. The only difference between this 
petn and No. 81-1022 is that in No. 81-1022, the court only de-
nied the press the right to attend voir dire proceedings but pro-
vided a transcript. The resp in No. 81-1022 argued that the case 
was moot · since the voir dire proceedings were over, but the pool 
memo concluded -- correctly, I think, see Globe Newspaper, supra 
that the problem was capable of repetition yet evading review, 
so apparently the mootness argument was not the reason for deni-
al. 
The decision below in No. 81-1022 was correct under Richmond 
Newspapers and Gannett, for Gannett upheld the closure of a pre-
trial proceeding on the theory that opening it presented a rea-
sonable probability of prejudice to the defendant. Richmond 
Newspapers, while recognizing a right to attend trials, very 
carefully distinguished Gannett as involving ~trial proceed-
ings. See 448 US at 564 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) ~ id. at 599 
(Stewart, J., concurring). Also, the arguments in No. 81-1022 
- 4 -
concerning Hovey, repeated here, seem to be without merit. 
First, Hovey does not mandate closure but only individual death 
qualification. Second, that lower courts apply Hovey differently 
in different cases does not mean that it is unconstitutionally 
vague. On the contrary, the individualized application of the 
rule tends to show that it is not a prior restraint. 
The added feature in this case, the refusal to release a 
transcript of the voir dire proceedings, is problematic. From 
the description of the case in the petn, it appears that this 
restriction is not merely temporary~ a CFR might clarify that 
point. Assuming that it is not temporary, I think that the court 
below was wrong. In Gannett, the Court thought it important that 
the denial of access was only temporary. 
Once the danger of prejudice had dissipated, 
a transcript of the suppression hearing was 
made available. The press and the public 
then had a full opportunity to scrutinize the 
suppression hearing. Unlike the case of an 
absolute ban on access, therefore, the press 
here had the opportunity to inform the public 
of the details of the pretrial hearing accu-
rately and completely. Under these circum-
stances, any First and Fourteenth Amendment 
right of the petitionere to attend a criminal 
trial was not violated. 
443 US at 393. 
The petr has not, however, given any indication that the 
practice of denying transcripts is a frequent occurence, and, 
given the clarity of the language in Gannett, I doubt that it is. 
Given the denial in No. 81-1022 and the language in Gannett, I 
recommend a denial here. 
- 5 -
There is an amicus brief from the California Newspapers 
Association in support of the petn. There is no response. 
November 11, 1982 Smalley order in petn 
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Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court 
No. 82-556 
David A. Charny October 6, 1983 
Question Presented 
May the state trial court in a criminal case close voir 
dire to the public and seal the transcript of the voir dire 
proceedings? 
- ,. . 





B. Standard of Review for Closure Orders 
c. Application of the Standard 
1. Required findings 
2. State interests in closure of voir dire 











bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court page 3. 
I. Background 
This case requires the Court to review resp's orders 
----.., 
closing voir dire proceedings to the public. The orders were _........ ~
issued during the trial of defendant Brown (not a party here) for 
murder and rape of a teenage girl. Three orders are before the 3 ~ 
~----
Court for review. 
~before voir dire began, the trial judge ruled 
against petr's motion that voir dire be openly conducted. App. 
1. He indicated that "individual voir dire with regard to death 
qualifications and any other special areas that counsel may feel 
some problem with regard to ••• would be in private and not 
subject to scrutiJ~A the press or anybody else not involved." 
App. 93. Counsel had argued that an open voir dire would inhibit 
jurors from candidly disclosing their feelings on issues 
important to the trial, particularly with relation to such 
matters as attitudes towards the death penalty and past 
experience with violent crime. Both prosecution and defense 
agreed to the limited closing of voir dire. The trial judge made ---no findings as to the need for closed voir dire, although he did 




~ af~er the jury was impaneled, petr moved for 
release of a complete transcript of the voir dire proceedings. 
Petr contended that refusal to release the transcript would 
constitute a prior restraint and that other California trial 
courts had ordered release in similar circumstances. App. 54-59. 
The trial judge denied the motion without prejudice, stating that 
bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court page 4. 
the "right to privacy ••• and a right to a fair trial should 
prevail [over] the right of the people to know II App. 121. .... 
~ petr renewed its motion at the conclusion of 
trial and sentencing. The trial judge again denied, finding that 
---.. 
the jurors during the closed voir dir~ had discussed "sensitive" _____.., 
experiences not "appropriate for public discussion." App. 39. -- -----------The Court of Appeal summarily denied a petition for mandamus to 
compel release of the transcript, and the California Supreme 
Court denied hearing. Petr had not appealed denial of his first 
or second motions. 
II. Discussion 
A. Mootness ~ ~~ ~~ 
The question whether transcripts should remain sealed is 
clearly not moot. The propriety of the closure orders is moot, 
---- e. 
however, unless "capable of rep,fti '' ion, yet evading review." 
Under that exception to mootness doctr~ne, a controversy is not 
considered moot if there is a "reasonable expectation" or 
demonstrated probability" that it will recur involving the same 
complaining party. Murphy v. Hunt, 50 u.s.L.W. 4264, 4265 (1982) 
(per curiam) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 
(1975) (per curiam)). In Richmond Newspapers, the Court reviewed 
an order closing trial to the public because "it is reasonably 
foreseeable that other trials may be closed by other judges 
without any more showing of need than is presented on this 
record." 448 U.S., at 563 (CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, announcing the 
judgment of the Court). Similarly, in Nebraska Press Assn. v. 
Stuart, 427 u.s. 539, 546-547 (1976), the Court reviewed a prior 
bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court page 5. 
restraint on reporting prior to the selection of the jury because 
another restrictive order might be entered if the criminal 
defendant were re-tried and because the state might seek such an 
order, affecting petr newspaper, in other criminal cases. Under 
~ 
these cases, none of the questions presented here ~ moot: 
closure of voir dire has occurred, and will probably continue to 
occur, in other trials. 
B. Standard of Review for Closure Orders ~~ 
 
vG lobe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S.Ct. 2613,~r 
2620 (1982), holds that 11 [w] here ••• the State attempts to deny~ 
the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of ~~ 
sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is ~ ~ 
necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is ;t7~ 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. II Further, Richmond v~ ... 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virgina, 448 u.s. 555 (1980), suggests tha~ 
the interests which justify the decision should be 11 articulaa~r­
in findings. • See also, In re United States ex rel. Pulitzer L 
Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. -., 
Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167-1169 (9th Cir. 1982) (overruling 
trial courts' closure of voir dire not based on adequate 
findings). 
Because Globe Newspaper, like this case, concerns 
closure on the ground that sensitive information must be withheld 
from the public, the only question as to the applicability of 
this standard might arise if voir dire were a pre-trial 
proceeding rather than part of the trial. Although the 
prosecution made this argument below, resp does not press the 
~--------------------------------------------------------------bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court page 6. 
point here. And it seems unquestionable that voir dire is an 
integral part of the trial itself. Each of the state courts and 
federal courts of appeals to address the issue, in applying 
either the federal constitutional rule of Richmond Newspapers or 
state constitutional provisions for an open trial, have 
considered impanelment of the jury to be part of trial. E.g., 
Pulitzer Publishing Co., supra; Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 
553 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Ark. 1977); Rapid City Journal v. Circuit 
Court, 283 N.W.2d 563, 566 (S.Dak. 1979); Great Falls Tribune v. 
District Court, 60S ~ .2d 116, 121 (Mont. 1980). 
Further, the factors which led the court to find a right 
of access to criminal trials apply equally to voir dire 
proceedings. First, the court emphasized that the criminal trial 
had ~istorically been open to the public. Richmond Newspapers, 
448 u.s., at 569, 589; Globe Newspaper, 102 s.ct., at 2619. 
Similarly, the vjury once consisted of the entire body of freemen 
~--------~ 
in the community; when the size of the jury was limited, jurors 
were still called from the public gathered at large and 
questioned in public as to their qualifications. See generally, 
Amicus brief of the Society of Professional Journalists, at 6-9. 
And while, in recent years, in-chambers voir dire or examination 
of jurors for improprieties during trial has been occasionally 
approved, e.g., United States v. Bufalino, 576 F.2d 446, 451 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (no objection from counsel); United States v. Miller, 
381 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1967), these cases involve challenges to 
this procedure by defendants under Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 43 (which 
bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court page 7. 
requires the presence of defendant at trial) , rather than by the 
press on first amendment grounds. 
Second, in Virginia Newspapers and Globe Newspaper, the 
Court found the right of access particularly important to the 
functioning of the judicial process: it enhances the quality of 
the factfinding process, ~sters an appearance of fairness, and 
~ermits the public to participate in the judicial process by 
observing and discussing its operation. E.g., Globe Newspaper, 
102 s.ct., at 2620. As courts have recognized, publicity may 
serve similar functions for voir dire by demonstrating the 
fairness of the process of jury selection and by exposing to 
public scrutiny both the statements made by veniremen and the 
conduct of the judge and counsel. E.g., Commercial Printing Co., 
553 S.W.2d, at 273. __ Thus, the requirements of Richmond 
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper appear fully applicable to the 
conduct of voir dire. 
c. Application of the Standard 
1. Required findings. -- As noted above, the trial court · 
~fde ~o_! indin~ in support of its initial order to close voir 
~dire. The court mentions only the criminal defendant's 
~~entitlement to a fair trial, without explaining how this is 
furthered at all by closing voir dire to the public. The court's 
reasoning can only be surmised by reading counsel's arguments. 
This is insufficient-L particularly where, as discussed below, 
there is no California precedent either authorizing or explaining 
the rationale for closure of voir dire. 
bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court page 8. 
The trial court made only conclusory findings in support 
of its second order to close voir dire and its order to seal the 
transcript. These findings are not sufficiently specific to 
justify the closure order. Allusion to "special experiences in 
sensitive areas" not "appropriate for public discussion," App. 
39, or to "private information," App. 66, does not give a 
reviewing court or to public observers information sufficient to 
evaluate the strength of the jurors' interest in privacy as 
against the public's right of access to trials. 
In Richmond Newspapers, the Court reversed despite the 
inadequacy of the trial court's findings, rather than remanding 
for further findings. 448 U.S., at 580-581 (CHIEF JUSTICE 
BURGER, announcing the judgment of the Court). However, in that 
case, remand would have been futile, because the closed trial had 
already been conducted. Here, in contrast, whether the ~ 
l.--....  .y..LJ"'"' 
transcripts should be sealed remains a live issue. The Court ~T-
should remand for further findings by the trial court on t~~ 
~~,.. 
because, as I shall argue below, proper findings may 
substantial interests that justify sealing of the 
transcript in this case. 
~· ~ 2. State interests in closure of voir dire. -- In 
~ addition to the absence of findings, the trial court's two 
closure orders might be reversed on the ground that no 
substantive interests justify closure._ Two arguments supporting 
closure appear in the record of the proceedings below. First, 
closure encourages candor on the part of prospective jurors and 
thereby aids in selection of an unbiased panel. Second, closure 
bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court page 9. 
protects the privacy of jurors who honestly answer sensitive 
questions posed during voir dire. 
Initially, it should be noted that~as a justification 
for closed voir dire, the second interest is premised upon the 
first. If the prosecution or defense had no interest in close 
personal questioning of prospective jurors, jurors' privacy could 
be protected merely by prohibiting questions that infringed 
unduly upon that privacy, or, indeed, any questions to which the 
jurors themselves objected. As resp concedes, Resp. Br. at 15, 
courts have traditionally granted jurors a privilege to refuse to 
answer questions which might incriminate or embarrass them. See, 
e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979) 
{upholding reasonable limitations on question to protect jurors 
from "inquiry into their essentially private concerns"). In 
California, the trial court exercises "considerable discretion 
••• to contain voir dire within reasonable limits." People v. 
Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 877 (1981). And even if jurors had no 
privilege to decline to answer unduly intrusive voir dire 
questions, recognizing such a privilege now would be a "least -
restrictive alternative" to closing voir dire altogether • . 
There is reason to doubt the state's interest in 
receiving candid answers to the types of questions apparently 
~----------~--~------
asked of the ·urors in this case. This interest has not been 
explicitly articulated, as far as I can determine, in California 
case law. People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869 (1981), which changed 
California law to permit questions relevant to peremptory 
challenges, does contain some strong rhetoric about the 
bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court page 10. 
. . . 
defendant's "substantial right" to "resonable latitude in the 
examination of prospective jurors as to their qualifications 
and the desirability for "extensive and probing" voir dire. 
However, nothing in the opinion indicates any state interest in 
" 
information about themselves that jurors might wish to keep 
private; rather, the opinion emphasizes the right to ask about 
attitudes that might have a bearing on the jurors' reactions to a 
case. Id., at n. 9. Jurors have no strong reason to conceal 
their attitudes on subjects such as the death penalty, the 
trustworthiness of policemen, or violent crime (examples cited in 
People v. Williams.) There is no conflict between a reasonably 
probing, public voir dire on juror attitudes and the jurors' 
interest in privacy. 
Further, there is no suggestion in California law that 
individuals might be less than candid in discussing these 
attitudes simply because voir dire is public. Williams does not 
touch on the issue at all, and Hovey v. Suprerior Court, 616 P.2d 
1301, 1347-1354 (1980), cited by the trial ccourt below, concerns 
the desirability of isolating jurors from each other during voir 
dire so that they will not be influenced by each others' answers 
to questions and by the repeated questions asked of each of them 
by counsel. Hovey therefore does not justify isolating jurors 
from the public, merely from each other during questioning. And, 
as noted above, conducting voir dire in public has been 
recognized to encourag~onest answers by prospective jurors, as 
it does by witnesses. I~ conclude, then, that there is no 
~
bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior CQur! page 11. 
state interest in 61osed voir dir~~ at least as these interests -------------
are now articulated by California law. 
3. State interests in sealing the transcript. -- Aside 
from a general interest in the conduct of voir dire in this 
personal manner, the state and jurors have a particular interest 
in sealing the transcript in this case because of the "implied 
promise of confidentiality" given to the jurors. Surely, jurors 
have a legitimate claim to have this promise honored, 
particularly when they have relied upon it in revealing 
information about themselves; and the state has an interest in 
honoring those promises that it does make. The record contains a 
number of representations of highly personal revelations on the 
part of jurors: for example, counsel for defendant represents, in 
his amicus brief at 6, that some jurors revealed that they had 
been victims of sexual abuse. The interest in honoring the 
state's promise to preserve such statements from public 
disclosure seems legitimate, regardless of the validity of the 
underlying closure order from which the promise of 
confidentiality presumably stems. 
I do not believe the Court has considered a case which 
required it to balance a first amendment right with rights to 
withhold information about oneself from public dissemination. 1 
1cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 u.s. 469 (1975), held that 
a state may not prohibit publ1cation of a rape victim's name in 
order to protect privacy. However, the Court emphasized there 
that "[b]y placing the information in the public domain on 
official court records, the State must be presumed to have 
concluded that the public interest was thereby being served." 
Footnote continued on next page. 
i 
bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court page 12. 
-
r) ~ 
The Court has approved, however, the common law doctrine that 
court records may be closed from the pu~lic to further a variety 
--------------------~ - ~~--------------
of privacy interests, including that in preventing the 
dissemination of scandalous or embarrassing information. See 
~Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 u.s. 589, 597-599 
(1978). As Warner Communications indicates, the balance must be 
struck on a case-by-case basis, weighing the public's need for 
access to the information contained in particular records against 
the harm disclosure may work on the individuals affected. See, 
e.g., Krause v. Rhodes, 671 F.2d 212, 219 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(sealing part of record of investigation of National Guard 
'--. 
conduct during campus disturbances). 
The common law doctrine suggests that protecting the 
statements purportedly made by some of the jurors in this case, 
under circumstances where confidentiality is promised, may rise 
to the level of a compelling state interest under Globe 
Newspapers. ,b !Jhere is insufficient support for such a 
~ ~. cor::_lusion i~recor~ of the present c~se. No findings in the 
~ ~rd indicate th~~nts were in fakt made. Further, 
court did not consider the less restrictive alternative 
~ releasing a redacted transcript from which statements too private 
~, to be justifiably disclosed had been removed. Thus, the Court 
~~reman~ a propriate findings and for consideration of 
t-1-. r..;;,.}wt/' ~ 
/: . -A~ , at 495. Here, in contrast, resp seeks to keep the records 
~v·~ut of public view altogether. Similarly, no right to privacy 
was at issue in Globe Newspaper, because the transcript of the 
closed trial would eventually be released. 102 s.ct., at 2622. 
1 




The - orders closing voir dire to the public should be 
~eser~d because it is supported neither by findings made in this 
case nor by state interests as articulated in California law. 
Such orders should be based upon a strong state policy shown by 
specific findings to be applicable in a given case. 
Th~jer seali~the transcript~hould_be vacated, and 
the case remanded for further proceedings to permit the trial 
court either to reverse its order or to make appropriate factual 
findings in support of it. Remand rather than reversal ~ -
justified for three reasons.~ the common law and federal 
constitutional precedents support, or at least are consistent 
with, a recognition that privacy interests may outweight a first 
amendment right of access to court records of past proceedings. 
~-
~ the tria \ did find, albeit in very general terms, that 
the jurors had a strong interest in the privacy of the 
transcripts in this case, while the record before the Court 
contains specific indications that the trial court's conclusions 
may be justified. c=T~~ remand w~'ll ermit tqe trial court to 
<~~ -:) 
fashion a remedy which better accommm aates tne competing 
interests here than would full disclosure of an unedited 
transcript. 
lfp/ss 10/10/83 
82-555 Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court 
This memo, summarizing points in David's bench 
memo, is merely a memory aid. 
Facts and Issue 
This California case resulted in the conviction of · 
a defendant of rape and murder of a teenage girl. He was 
sentenced to death. The question, one left open in Richmond 
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper Co. is whether - and under 
what circumstances - a state trial court may close voir dire 
to the public during the examination of jurors, and there-
after seal the transcript permanently. 
Three orders are here for review: (i) with ap-
proval of counsel for both sides and before voir dire began 
the TC denied petitioner's (Press Enterprise) motion that 
voir dire be conducted openly; (ii) after voir dire was com-
pleted, and jury impaneled, the TC denied motion to release 
a transcript of voir dire; and (iii) at the end of trial and 
sentencing, the TC again denied such a motion, finding that 
some jurors had discussed "sensitive" experiences. 
The California Court of Appeals and the State Su-
preme Court both summarily upheld the TC's rulings. 
The issues are not moot. See Richmond Newspapers 
(capable of reception yet evading review), also, final seal-
ing of voir dire record of course is not moot. 
r, ' 
2. 
Standard of Review 
In Globe Newspaper Co. (1982} we said the state 
must show that denial is required by a compelling governmen-
tal interest, and that least restrictive means should be 
used. 
Although the CJ has indicated in a concurring 
opinion in Gannett that the term "trial" does not include 
pretrial motions, it is clear that voir dire is a part of a 
trial. 
A difficulty with the state's position here is 
that, apart from general references to a "fair trial", "sen-
sitive quetions", and privacy, the TC made no findings. 
State Interests as Argued 
It is said that closure encourages candor, and 
protects privacy (the latter, of course, being related to 
the first}. 
Absent more specific findings, these interests are 
inadequate. No evidence as to whether a generalization this 
broad is justified. Moreover, courts usually grant jurors 
the privilege of refusing to answer questions that embarras&. ' 
them. David recommends, and I am inclined to agree>that the 
alleged state interests do noisupport closing the voir dire. 
---=--
ad 
State Interests Are Greater with Respect to Permant Sealing 
of Transcript 7 \ 
There is at least an implied promise of confiden-
tiality given to jurors once they serve on the panel. Both 
3. 
the state and the iurors have a legitimate interest in the 
honoring of this promise. 
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 
489, 597-599 (1978), we recognized - as a common law doc-
tv ~~-e' ( 
trine - that court records may be closed f~ · privacy inter-
ests. ~'#~ .. ; 
(1) Reverse the orders closing voir dire as not 
supported by any findings made. 
(2) Vacate and remand the order permanently seal-
ing the transcript, and require the TC either to reverse the 
order or to make appropriate factual findings in support of 
it. A different decision with respect to the permanent 
sealing is justified by the recognition - at common law in 
our cases - that privacy interests may outweigh a First 
Amendment right of access to court records of past proceed-
ings. The trial court, at least, did find - though in gen-
eral terms - that jurors had a strong privacy interest. 
Moreover, a remand may permit the trial court to adopt 
"least restrictive means" to accommodate the competing 
interests. 
L • F • P • , ,J r • 
ss 
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82-S~'Press Rnterprise Cn. v. Superior Court 
"'his memo, summarizing points in David's bench 
memo, is merely a memory aid. 
Facts and tssue 
, J; 'T'his Cali.fornia case resulted in the conviction of 
a defend~~t of raoe 1and murder of a teenage qirl. Re was 
sentenced to death. 'T'he question, one left open in Richmond 
NewsPRPer~ and Globe N~wspaoer rn. ts whether ~ and under 
what circumstances - a state trial court may close voir ~ire 
to the public during the examination of iurors, and there-
.. ~-~ " . 
after seal . +:he transcr1Pt oermc.nently. 
~ . 
Three orders are here for review: (i) wi ,th ap-
proval of counsel for both sides and before voir dire began 
the Tr denied petitioner's (Press Enterprise) motion that 
' ' 
vo:i.r d}re be conr!ucted openlv1 (ii) after voir di.r.e was com-
pleter'!, anrl ;urv jmpanelen, the 'T'r denied motion to release 
a tr~nscrtpt of voir dire~ and (iii) at the end of trial and 
sentencing, the 'T'C again denied such a motion, finding that 
some iur.:or.s hao discussed "sensitive" experiences. 
'T'he Cali. fornia Court of J\ppeals and the State Su-
preme C'ourt both summarilv uphe1.d the 'T'C's rulinqs. 
'T'he issues are not moot. See Richmond Newspapers 
(capable of reception vet evading review), also, final seal-
inq of voir dire record of course is not moot. 
\. "'· 
2. 
Stannar~ of 'Review 
In Globe ~ewspaper ro. (1982) we said the state 
must show that denial i.s required by a compell inq governmen-
tal interest, and that least rPstrictive means should be 
used. 
~lthouqh the rJ has indicated in a concurring 
opinion in Gannett that the tPrm "trial" noPs not include 
pretrial motions, . it is cV~ar that. voir dire is a part of a 
~ ,(, 
tr j al. 
\ 'llf ! 
A niffi.cultv '"it h thP state's position hPre i.s 
,.., 
that, apart from aen~ral references to a "fair trial", "sen-
si.tlv~ auetlons", ant! privacv, th~ rrr ma<'iP no fi.nrHnqs. 
~tate Interests as Argue~ ~- .. ' 
It is said that closure encourages candor, and 
protects pr1vacv (the lattpr, of course, helnq related to 
•. 
the fi.rst). .'JI.' 
~ Ahsent more specific Findings, these interests are 
•,:.Vt{•.ii;il\f,.l::'?;::''l 
inadequate. Xi·No evidPnce as to whether a qeneraUzC\tion thi.s 
',,,.~~\ • :80: :!~; 
broad is !iustified. Moreover, courts usuallv qrant iurors 
the or ivi.leqe of refusinq to answer questions that embarrass~ " 
them. David recommends, and r am incl :!ned to aqreP, that the 
alleged state interests do no support closina the voir dire. 
' 
( 
State tnterests Are ~reater with Respect to Permant Sealina 
of Transcript 
There is at least an implied oromtse of confiden-
tiality given to iurors once they serve on the pane\~ Both 
3. 
the state and the ~urors have a leqitimate interest in the 
honorinq of this promise. I 
In ~ixon v. Warner Communicati.ons, Tnc., 435 u.s. 
489, 597-599 (1978), we recognized -as a common law doc-
trine - that court records may be close~ for privacy inter-
ests. 
(1) Reverse the orders closing voir dire as not 
supported by anv finninqs mad~. 
(2) Va~ate and remand the order permanently seal-
ing the transcript, and requLre the Tr either to reverse 
order or to make appropriate factual findinqs in support of 
'· · it. A different decision with respect to the permanent 
seaJing is iust~fied bv the recoqni.tion- at common law in 
our cases - that privacy interests may outweiqh a First 
Amennment right of access to court records of past proceed-
inqs. The trial court, at least, did fin~ - though in qen-
era~ terms - that ~urors had a strona privacy interest. 
Moreover, R remand mav permit the trial court to adopt 
"J.eaRt restrictive means" to accommodate the cornpfl'tinq 
interests. 
L. F • 'P • , ,'T r • 
ss 
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FORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 9 ~ ~t~ 
[January-, 1984] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the court. I(, ~ f-
We granted certiorari to decide whether the guarantees of ~ k 
open public proceedings in criminal trials cover proceedings ~ q 
for the voir dire examination of potential jurors. ~ f 
I 
Albert Greenwood Brown, Jr., was tried and convicted of 
the rape and murder of a teenage girl, and sentenced to death 
in California Superior Court. Before the voir dire examina-
tion of prospective jurors began, petitioner, Press-Enter-
prise Co., moved that the voir dire be open to the public and 
the press. Petitioner contended that the public had an abso-
lute right to attend the trial, and asserted that the trial com-
menced with the voir dire proceedings. The State opposed 
petitioner's motion, arguing that if the press were present, 
juror responses would lack the candor necessary to assure a 
fair trial. 
The trial judge agreed and permitted petitioner to attend 
only the "general voir dire." He stated that counsel would 
conduct the "individual voir dire with regard to death quali-
fications and any other special areas that counsel may feel 
some problem with regard to ... in private .... " App. 93. 
The voir dire consumed six weeks and all but approximately 
three days was closed to the public. 
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After the jury was empaneled, petitioner moved the trial 
court to release a complete transcript of the voir dire pro-
ceedings. At oral argument on the motion, the trial judge 
described the responses of prospective jurors at their voir 
dire: 
"Most of them are of little moment. There are a few, 
however, in which some personal problems were dis-
cussed which could be somewhat sensitive as far as 
publication of those particular individual's situations are 
concerned." App. 103. 
Counsel for Brown argued that release of the transcript 
would violate the jurors' right of privacy. The prosecutor 
agreed, adding that the prospective jurors had answered 
questions under an "implied promise of confidentiality." 
App. 111. The court denied petitioner's motion, concluding 
as follows: 
"I agree with much of what defense counsel and People's 
counsel have said and I also, regardless of the public's 
right to know, I also feel that's rather difficult that by a 
person performing their civic duty as a prospective juror 
putting their private information as open to the public 
which I just think there is certain areas that the right of 
privacy should prevail and a right to a fair trial should 
prevail and the right of the people to know, I think 
should have some limitations, so at this stage, the motion 
to open up the individual sequestered voir dire proceed-
ings is denied without prejudice." App. 121. 
After Brown had been convicted and sentenced to death, 
petitioner again applied for release of the transcript. In de-
nying this application, the judge stated: 
"The jurors were questioned in private relating to past 
experiences, and while most of the information is dull 
and boring, some of the jurors had some special experi-
ences in sensitive areas that do not appear to be appro-
priate for public discussion." App. 39. 
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Petitioner then sought in the California Court of Appeal a 
writ of mandate to compel the Superior Court to release the 
transcript and vacate the order closing the voir dire proceed-
ings. The petition was denied. The California Supreme 
Court denied petitioner's request for a hearing. We granted 
certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1983). We reverse. 
II 
The trial of a criminal case places the factfinding function in 
a jury of twelve unless by statute or consent the jury is fixed 
at a lesser number or a jury is waived. The process of juror 
selection is itself a matter of importance, not simply to the 
adversaries but to the criminal justice system. In Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 569 
(1980), the plurality opinion summarized the evolution of the 
criminal trial as we know it today and concluded that "at the 
time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials 
both here and in England had long been presumptively 
open." A review of the historical evidence is also helpful for 
present purposes. It reveals that, since the development of 
trial by jury, the process of selection of jurors has presump-
tively been a public process with exceptions only for good 
cause t:hl"evffi. 
A 
The roots of open trials reach back to the days before the 
Norman Conquest when cases in England were brought be-
fore "moots" a town meeting kind of body such as the local 
court of the hundred or the county court. 1 Attendance was 
virtually compulsory on the part of the freemen of the com-
munity, who represented the "patria," or the "country," in 
rendering judgment. The public aspect thus was "almost a 
necessary incident of jury trials, since the presence of a jury 
'Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, 1 Select Essarys 
in Anglo-American Legal History 88, 89 (1907). 
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already insured the presence of a large part of the 
public." 2 
As the jury system evolved in the years after the Norman 
Conquest, and the jury came to be but a small segment repre-
senting the community, the obligation of all freeman to at-
tend criminal trials was relaxed; however, the public charac-
ter of the proceedings, including jury selection, remained 
unchanged. Later, during the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
turies, the jury became an impartial trier of facts, owing in 
large part to a development in that period, allowing chal-
lenges. 3 1 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 332, 
335 (7th ed. 1956). Since then, the accused has generally en-
joyed the right to challenge jurors in open court at the outset 
of the trial. 4 
Although there appear to be few contemporary accounts of 
the process of jury selection of that day, 5 one early record 
2 Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L. Q. 381, 388 (1932); see 3 
W. Blackstone, Commentaries 349 (13th ed. 1800). 
8 In 1352, a statute was enacted to permit challenges to petit jurors on 
the ground of their participation as "indicators" on the presenting jury. 25 
Edw. 3, C. 3, § 5; see T. Plunkett, A Concise History of Common Law 109 
(1929). Objections had always been allowed on grounds of personal hostil-
ity. 1 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 332, 324-25 (7th ed. 
1956). 
'In Peter Cook's Trial, 4 Har. St. Tr. 736, 738-740 (0. B. 1696), the 
accused himself attempted to pose questions directly to jurors in order to 
sustain challenges. "You may ask upon a Voyer Dire, whether he [the ju-
ror] have any Interest in the Cause; nor shall we deny you Liberty to ask 
whether he be fitly qualified, according to Law by having a Freehold of 
sufficent Value." Id., at 736. And in Harrison's Trial, 2 Har. St. Tr. 
309, 313 (0. B. 1660), the reporter remarks that the defendant's persis-
tence in challenging jurors provoked laughter in the courtroom: "Here the 
People seemed to laugh," he writes, upon the defendant's tenth peremp-
tory challenge. 
5 As noted in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U. S., at 565 n. 5, it is not 
surprising that there is little in the way of contemporary record of the 
openness of those early trials. Historians have commented that early An-
glo-Saxon laws "deal rather with the novel and uncertain, than with the 
normal and undoubted rules of law. . . . Why trouble to record that which 
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written in 1565 places the trial "[i]n the towne house, or in 
some open or common place." T. Smith, De Republica 
Anglorum 96 (Alston ed. 1906). Smith explained that "there 
is nothing put in writing but the enditement": 
"All the rest is doone openlie in the presence of the 
Judges, the Justices, the enquest, the prisoner, and so 
many as will or can come so neare as to heare it, and all 
depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men 
may heare from the mouth of the depositors and wit-
nesses what is saide." Id., at 101 (emphasis added). 
If we accept this account it appears that beginning in the six-
teenth century, jurors were selected in public. 
As the trial began, the judge and the accused were 
present. Before calling jurors, the judge "telleth the cause 
of their comming, and [thereby] giveth a good lesson to the 
people." Id., at 96-97 (emphasis added). The indictment 
was then read; if the accused pleaded not guilty, the jurors 
were called forward, one by one, at which time the defendant 
was allowed to make his challenges. I d., at 98. Smith 
makes clear that the entire trial proceeded "openly, that not 
only the xii [12 jurors], but the Judges, the parties and as 
many [others] as be present may heare." Id., at 79 (empha-
sis added). 
This open process gave assurance to those not attending 
trials that others were able to observe the proceedings and 
enhanced public confidence. The presence of bystanders 
served yet another purpose according to Blackstone. If 
challenges kept a sufficient number of qualified jurors from 
appearing at the trial, "either party may pray a tales." 3 W. 
Blackstone, supra, at 364; see also M. Hale, The History of 
the Common Law of England 342 (6th ed. 1820). A "tales" 
was the balance necessary to supply the deficiency. 6 
every village elder knows?" E. Jenks, A Short History of English Law 
3-4 (2d ed. 1922). 
6 By the statute 35 Hen. 8, ch. 6 (1543), the judge was empowered to 
award a "tales de circumstantibus, of persons present in court, to be joined 
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The presumptive openness of the jury selection process in 
England, not surprisingly, carried over into proceedings in 
colonial America. For example, several accounts noted the 
need for talesmen at the trials of Thomas Preston and Wil-
liam W emms, two of the British soldiers who were charged 
with murder after the so-called Boston Massacre in 1770.7 
Public jury selection thus was the common practice in Amer-
ica when the Constitution was adopted. 
B 
For present purposes, how we allocate the "right" to open-
ness as between the accused and the public, or whether we 
view it as a component inherent in the system benefitting 
both, is not crucial. No right ranks higher than the right of 
the accused to a fair trial. But the primacy of the accused's 
right is difficult to separate from the right of everyone in the 
community to attend the voir dire which promotes fairness. 
The open trial thus plays as important a role in the admin-
istration of justice today as it did for centuries before our 
separation from England. The value of openness lies in the 
fact that people not actually attending trials can have confi-
dence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure 
knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that 
established procedures are being followe~and that deviations -:{1:= 
will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic 
fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness 
so essential to public confidence in the system. 
to the other jurors to try the cause." 3 W. Blackstone, supra, at 365. If 
the judge issued such a writ, the sheriff brought forward "talesmen" from 
among the bystanders in the courtroom. These .talesmen were then sub-
ject to the same challenges as the others. 
7 3 Legal Papers of John Adams 18 (1965) (quoting William Palfrey to 
John Wilkes, Oct. 1770, in Elsey, "John Wilkes and William Palfrey," 34 
Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 411, 423-425 (1943)); id., at 49 n. 9 (quoting Acting 
Governor Thomas Hutchinson in C. B. Mayo ed., Additions to Hutchin-
son's History 32); id. , at 100. 
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Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S., at 
56!}...-571. 
This openness has what is sometimes described as a "com-
munity therapeutic value." Id., at 570. Criminal acts, es-
pecially violent crimes, often provoke public concern, even 
outrage and hostility; this in turn generates a community 
urge to retaliate and desire to have justice done. See T. 
Reik, The Compulsion to Confess 288-295, 408 (1959). 
Whether this is viewed as retribution or otherwise is irrele-
vant. When the public is aware that the law is being en-
forced and the criminal justice system is functioning, an 
outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and 
emotions. Proceedings held in secret would deny this outlet 
and frustrate the broad public interest; by contrast, public 
proceedings vindicate the concerns of the victims and the 
community in knowing that offenders are being brought to 
account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly 
selected. See United States v. Hasting, -- U. S. --, 
- (1983); Morris v. Slappy,- U. S. - , - (1983). 
"People in an open society do not demand infallibility from 
their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what 
they are prohibited from observing." Richmond Newspa-
pers, supra, at 572. Closed proceedings, although not abso-
lutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that 
outweighs the value of openness. 8 The presumption of 
8 That for certain purposes, e. g. , double jeopardy, a trial begins when 
th~first witness, Wade v. Hunter, 366 U. S. 684, 688 (1949), Qr the Jurors, 
Downum v. United States, 372 U. S. 734 (1963), are sworn does not bear 
on the question presented here. The rules of attachment of jeopardy rep-
resent the broad perception that the Government's action has reached the 
point where its power to retrace its steps must be checked by the "counter-
vailing interests of the individual protected by the double jeopardy clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. " United States v. Velazquez, 490 F . 2d 29, 34 
(CA2 1973); accord United States v. Jam, 400 U. S. 470, 480 (1971). By 
contrast, the question we address-whether the voir dire process must be 
open-focuses on First, rather than Fifth, Amendment values and the his-
torical backdrop against which the First Amendment was enacted. 
7 
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openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest 
based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher 
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The 
interest is to be articulated along with findings specific 
enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the 
closure order was properly entered. We now turn to 
whether the presumption of openness has been rebutted in 
this case. 
III 
Although three days of voir dire in this case were open to 
the public, six weeks of the proceedings were closesf, and me-
dia requests for the transcript were denied. 9 The Superior 
Court asserted two interests in support of its closure order 
and orders denying a transcript: the right of the defendant to 
a fair trial, and the right to privacy of the prospective jurors, 
for any whose "special experiences in sensitive areas . . . do 
not appear to be appropriate for public discussion." Supra, 
at --. Of course the right of an accused to fundamental 
fairness and the ri ht of ros ective 'urors to rivac are 
comBelling interests. But the a · ornia court's conclusion 
thatS'*titli Jrmellament and privacy interests were sufficient 
to warrant prolonged closure was unsupported by findings 
showing that an open proceeding in fact threatened those in-
terests; 10 hence it is not possible to conclude that closure was 
9 We cannot fail to observe that a voir dire process of such length, in and 
of itself undennines public confidence in the courts and the legal profes-
sion. The process is to ensure a fair impartial jury, not a favorable one. 
Judges, not advocates, must control that process to make sure privileges 
are not so abused. Properly conducted it is inconceivable that the process 
could extend over such a period. We note, however, that in response to 
questions counsel stated that it is not unknown in California courts for jury 
selection to extend six months. 
10 We have previously noted that in some limited circumstances, closure 
may be warranted. Thus a trial judge may, "in the interest of the fair ad-
ministration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial. 
'[T]he question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as 
not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge ... the opportunities for the com-
munication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially 
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warranted. 11 The trial court's orders denying access to voir 
dire testimony also failed to consider whether alternatives 
were available to protect the interests of the prospective ju-
rors that the trial court's orders sought to guard. Absent 
consideration of alternatives to closure, the trial court could 
not constitutionally close the voir dire. 
We turn to consider whether alternatives to closure were 
available to protect asserted privacy rights of prospective ju-
rors. The trial involved testimony concerning an alleged 
rape of a teenage girl. Some questions may have been ap-
propriate to prospective jurors that would give rise to legiti-
mate privacy interests of those persons. For example a pro-
spective juror might privately inform the judge that she, or a 
member of her family, had been raped but had declined to 
seek prosecution because of the embarassment and emotional 
trauma from the very disclosure of the episode. The privacy 
rights of such a prospective juror must be balanced against 
the historic values we have discussed and the need for 
opennessof the process. 
associated with resort to public places.'" Richmond Newspapers, 448 
U. S., at 555 n. 18 (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941)). 
11 Petitioner contends that respondent's closure order was based on the 
requirement in Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 80, 616 P. 2d 1301 
(1980), that jurors answer voir dire questions concerning juror death quali-
fications "outside the presence of ... fellow venirepersons.'' The docket 
sheet merely states, however, that petitioner's motion to be admitted to 
jury voir dire "is denied and granted in part, as stated on the record." 
The transcript of hearing on the motion is unenlightening on this score. 
See App. 93. Thus, it is not clear that the judge's ruling was based on 
Hovey. 
Assuming that Hovey was the basis for the trial court's order, it is un-
clear that the interests Hovey sought to protect could have justified re-
spondent's closure order. In Hovey, the California Supreme Court fo-
cused on studies that indicated that jurors were prejudiced by the answers 
of other jurors during voir dire. There was no indication that the presence 
of the public or press affected jurors. The California Supreme Court in 
fact stated that its decision would not "in any way affect the open nature of 
a trial. " 28 Cal. 3d, at 80-81. 
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To preserve fairness and at the same time protect legiti-
mate privacy, a trial judge must at all times maintain control 
of the process of jury selection and should inform the array of 
prospective jurors, once the general nature of sensitive ques-
tions is made known to them, that those individuals believing 
public questioning will prove damaging because of 
embarassment, may properly request an opportunity to 
present the problem to the judge in camera but with counsel 
present and on the record. 
By requiring the prospective juror to make an affirmative 
request, the trial judge can ensure that there is in fact a valid 
basis for a belief that disclosure infringes a significant inter-
est in privacy. This process will minimize the risk of un-
necessary closure. The exercise of sound discretion by the 
court may lead to excusing such a person from jury service. 
When limited closure is ordered, the constitutional values 
sought to be protected by holding open proceedings may be 
satisfied later by making a transcript of the closed proceed-
ings available within a reasonable time, if the judge deter-
mines that disclosure can be accomplished while safeguarding 
the juror's valid privacy interests. Even then a valid pri-
vacy right may rise to a level that part of the transcript 
should be sealed, or the name of a juror withheld, to protect 
the person from embarassment. 
The judge at this trial closed an incredible six weeks of voir 
dire without considering alternatives to closure. Later the 
court declined to release a transcript of the voir dire even 
while stating that "most of the information" in the transcript 
was "dull and boring." Supra, at--. Sensitive material 
reasonably entitled to privacy could have been strickeirDr 
sealed without such a sweeping order. Some effort should 
have been directed to identifying such materiaL 
Assuming that some jurors had protectible privacy inter-
ests in some of their answers, the trial judge provided no ex-
planation why his broad order denying access to information 
at the voir dire was not limited to information that was actu-
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ally sensitive and deserving of privacy protection. Nor did 
he consider whether he could disclose the substance of the 
sensitive answers while preserving the anonymity of the ju-
rors involved. 
Thus not only was there a failure to articulate findings with 
the requisite specificity but there was also a failure to con-
sider alternatives to closure and possible partial releases of 
the transcript. ~
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is vacated, and the 
case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Subject to the comments be1ow, t ' will be qlad to 
join your opinion. 
l. On p. 8 your opl n ion t=;ta tes: 
"Of coursa the right of an accusPd to funda-
mental fairness and the riqht of prospective 
;urors to privacv are comnelling interests." 
Although I think other portions of your opinion do not 
equate the two "rights" in such absolute terms, I woul~ find 
it difficult to agree that "privacy" in the ordinarv sense 
extends to a nerson who is called tn serve on the 1ury. 
Such a person's privacy, for example, if' not comparnhle to 
Fourth Amendment privacv. In this case - a~ you make clear 
elsewhere - we are concPrned onl with the limited privacy ~ 
juror rnav have where it is dernonstrablP that a truthful an-
swer to votr dire questions would disclose highly Pr vate 
personal information (e.g., rape victim). y guess ~s that 
many of. the questions that properJy mE~y he asked iurors in-
' volve some el~~ent of embarrassment for a s~nsitive juror, 
e.q., "Row long have you been une:!lployed?", · and "Have you 
ever brought a damage suit and lost it? 
2. It seems to me that the opinion, partjcularlv 
the last two oaragr~ph8 in Part III (pp. 10,11) do not make 
clear enough that certainly the greater part of the voir 
dire transcript in this case should be disclosed to the pub-
lic. T;e last sentence i~ the first of these paragraphs (p. 
,, 10) Rtates merf'ly that "soMe effort" should be made to iden-
tify the confidential material. And on p. Jl the draft 
'states there was "a failure to consider alternatives to clo-
sure and possible partial releases of the transcript" (p. 
11). Should we not order that only clearly confidential 









..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
Re: 
~ttpTtmt <lfo-n:rt of tlrt ,-m±tb ~tait.S" 
'Jiaglfington. ~. (if. 20fi"~ 
j 
December 20, 1983 
82-556 - Press-Enterprise Company 
v. Superior Court of California, 
Riverside County 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
CHAMI!IERS 0,.-
.JUSTICE WN . ..1 . BRENNAN, .JR. 
December 20, 1983 
No. 82-556 
Press-Enterprise Company 





.f/ . I 
~/ I l- I I \. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMeERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . RE.HNQUIST 
jb:prtmt Clfourl ~tf f!rt ~tb .itatts 
.ultin!lhtn. ~. <!f. 2ll?'i~ 
December 30, 1983 
Re: No. 82-556 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court of California, Riverside County 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerel~ 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
', 
CHAM8ERS Of" 
JUSTICE WH. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
January 4, 1984 
No. 82-556 
Press-Enterprise Canpany 
v. Superior Court of 
California, Riverside County 
Dear Chief, 
I have joined your op1n1on in the 
aoove but would feel more comfortable if 
you could accommodate Thurgood's concern 
as expressed in his opinion concurring 
in the judgment. Can you do so? 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
WJ!I ... ,..... \ftl. ... , 
January 5, 1984 
PERSONAL 
82-556 Press Enterprise 
Dear Chief: 
For the most part, your c:;uqqested changes are 
quite helpful and are fine with me. 
On page 9, second paragraph, I suggest a modest 
change such as the language I have underscored: 
"The iury selection process may, in some cir-
cumstances, give rise to a compelling inter-
est of the prospective ;urors when interroqa-
tion touches on rleeoly personaL matters that 
a person has legitimate rea~ons for keeping 
out of the public rlomain." 
The change would merely give some idea as to the 
"matters" as to which a person may have a legitimate reason 
for confidentiality. 
On page 10, I suggest that your second chanqe read 
as follows: 
"A trial judge must explain why the material 
is entitled to privacy" . 
As this case i.llustrates , some iudqes rule t.,ithout 
giving any satisfactory explanation. The l~nquage I Ruggest 
is a bit stronger than requiring merely that the iudqe give 
"~ome explanation". 
I appreciate your qivinq me the opportunity to 
comment on your changes that I think do signi.fic~ntly 
strengthen the opinion . My suggestions are for exrnphasis , 
and to make trial judges toe the line . 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
CHANGES THROUGHOUT 1- -I l 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-556 
PRESS-ENTERPRISE COMPANY, PETITIONER v. 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, 
RIVERSIDE COUNTY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF 
CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[January-, 1984] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the guarantees of 
open public proceedings in criminal trials cover proceedings 
for the voir dire examination of potential jurors. 
I 
Albert Greenwood Brown, Jr., was tried and convicted of 
the rape and murder of a teenage girl, and sentenced to death 
in California Superior Court. Before the voir dire examina-
tion of prospective jurors began, petitioner, Press-Enter-
prise Co., moved that the voir dire be open to the public and 
the press. Petitioner contended that the public had an abso-
lute right to attend the trial, and asserted that the trial com-
menced with the voir dire proceedings. The State opposed 
petitioner's motion, arguing that if the press were present, 
juror responses would lack the candor necessary to assure a 
fair trial. 
The trial judge agreed and permitted petitioner to attend 
only the "general voir dire." He stated that counsel would 
conduct the "individual voir dire with regard to death quali-
fications and any other special areas that counsel may feel 
some problem with regard to ... in private .... " App. 93. 
The voir dire consumed six weeks and all but approximately 
three days was closed to the public. 
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Mter the jury was empaneled, petitioner moved the trial 
court to release a complete transcript of the voir dire pro-
ceedings. At oral argument on the motion, the trial judge 
described the responses of prospective jurors at their voir 
dire: 
"Most of them are of little moment. There are a few, 
however, in which some personal problems were dis-
cussed which could be somewhat sensitive as far as 
publication of those particular individual's situations are 
concerned." App. 103. 
Counsel for Brown argued that release of the transcript 
would violate the jurors' right of privacy. The prosecutor 
agreed, adding that the prospective jurors had answered 
questions under an "implied promise of confidentiality." 
App. 111. The court denied petitioner's motion, concluding 
as follows: 
"I agree with much of what defense counsel and People's 
counsel have said and I also, regardless of the public's 
right to know, I also feel that's rather difficult that by a 
person performing their civic duty as a prospective juror 
putting their private information as open to the public 
which I just think there is certain areas that the right of 
privacy should prevail and a right to a fair trial should 
prevail and the right of the people to know, I think 
should have some limitations, so at this stage, the motion 
to open up the individual sequestered voir dire proceed-
ings is denied without prejudice." App. 121. 
Mter Brown had been convicted and sentenced to death, 
petitioner again applied for release of the transcript. In de-
nying this application, the judge stated: 
"The jurors were questioned in private relating to past 
experiences, and while most of the information is dull 
and boring, some of the jurors had some special experi-
ences in sensitive areas that do not appear to be appro-
priate for public discussion." App. 39. 
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Petitioner then sought in the California Court of Appeal a 
writ of mandate to compel the Superior Court to release the 
transcript and vacate the order closing the voir dire proceed-
ings. The petition was denied. The California Supreme 
Court denied petitioner's request for a hearing. We granted 
certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1983). We reverse. 
II 
The trial of a criminal case places the factfinding function in 
a jury of twelve unless by statute or consent the jury is fixed 
at a lesser number or a jury is waived. The process of juror 
selection is itself a matter of importance, not simply to the 
adversaries but to the criminal justice system. In Rich-
rrwnd Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 569 
(1980), the plurality opinion summarized the evolution of the 
criminal trial as we know it today and concluded that "at the 
time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials 
both here and in England had long been presumptively 
open." A review of the historical evidence is also helpful for 
present purposes. It reveals that, since the development of 
trial by jury, the process of selection of jurors has presump-
tively been a public process with exceptions only for good 
cause shown. 
A 
The roots of open trials reach back to the days before the 
Norman Conquest when cases in England were brought be-
fore "moots" a town meeting kind of body such as the local 
court of the hundred or the county court. 1 Attendance was 
virtually compulsory on the part of the freemen of the com-
munity, who represented the "patria," or the "country," in 
rendering judgment. The public aspect thus was "almost a 
necessary incident of jury trials, since the presence of a jury 
1 Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, 1 Select Essarys 
in Anglo-American Legal History 88, 89 (1907). 
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already insured the presence of a large part of the 
public." 2 
As the jury system evolved in the years after the Norman 
Conquest, and the jury came to be but a small segment repre-
senting the community, the obligation of all freeman to at-
tend criminal trials was relaxed; however, the public charac-
ter of the proceedings, including jury selection, remained 
unchanged. Later, during the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
turies, the jury became an impartial trier of facts, owing in 
large part to a development in that period, allowing chal-
lenges.3 1 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 332, 
335 (7th ed. 1956). Since then, the accused has generally en-
joyed the right to challenge jurors in open court at the outset 
of the trial. 4 
Although there appear to be few contemporary accounts of 
the process of jury selection of that day,S one early record 
2 Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L. Q. 381, 388 (1932); see 3 
W. Blackstone, Commentaries 349 (13th ed. 1800). 
8 In 1352, a statute was enacted to permit challenges to petit jurors on 
the ground of their participation as "indicators" on the presenting jury. 25 
Edw. 3, C. 3, § 5; see T. Plunkett, A Concise History of Common Law 109 
(1929). Objections had always been allowed on grounds of personal hostil-
ity. 1 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 332, 324-25 (7th ed. 
1956). 
• In Peter Cook's Trial, 4 Har. St. Tr. 736, 738-740 (0. B. 1696), the 
accused himself attempted to pose questions directly to jurors in order to 
sustain challenges. "You may ask upon a Voyer Dire, whether he [the ju-
ror] have any Interest in the Cause; nor shall we deny you Liberty to ask 
whether he be fitly qualified, according to Law by having a Freehold of 
sufficent Value." Id., at 736. And in Harrison's Trial, 2 Har. St. Tr. 
309, 313 (0. B. 1660), the reporter remarks that the defendant's persis-
tence in challenging jurors provoked laughter in the courtroom: "Here the 
People seemed to laugh," he writes, upon the defendant's tenth peremp-
tory challenge. 
6 As noted in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U. S., at 565 n. 5, it is not 
surprising that there is little in the way of contemporary record of the 
openness of those early trials. Historians have commented that early An-
glo-Saxon laws "deal rather with the novel and uncertain, than with the 
normal and undoubted rules of law. . . . Why trouble to record that which 
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written in 1565 places the trial "[i]n the towne house, or in 
some open or common place." T. Smith, De Republica 
Anglorum 96 (Alston ed. 1906). Smith explained that "there 
is nothing put in writing but the enditement": 
"All the rest is doone openlie in the presence of the 
Judges, the Justices, the enquest, the prisoner, and so 
many as will or can come so neare as to heare it, and all 
depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men 
may heare from the mouth of the depositors and wit-
nesses what is saide." !d., at 101 (emphasis added). 
If we accept this account it appears that beginning in the six-
teenth century, jurors were selected in public. 
As the trial began, the judge and the accused were 
present. Before calling jurors, the judge "telleth the cause 
of their comming, and [thereby] giveth a good lesson to the 
people." !d., at 9&-97 (emphasis added). The indictment 
was then read; if the accused pleaded not guilty, the jurors 
were called forward, one by one, at which time the defendant 
was allowed to make his challenges. I d., at 98. Smith 
makes clear that the entire trial proceeded "openly, that not 
only the xii [12 jurors], but the Judges, the parties and as 
many [others] as be present may heare." !d., at 79 (empha-
sis added). 
This open process gave assurance to those not attending 
trials that others were able to observe the proceedings and 
enhanced public confidence. The presence of bystanders 
served yet another purpose according to Blackstone. If 
challenges kept a sufficient number of qualified jurors from 
appearing at the trial, "either party may pray a tales." 3 W. 
Blackstone, supra, at 364; see also M. Hale, The History of 
the Common Law of England 342 (6th ed. 1820). A "tales" 
was the balance necessary to supply the deficiency. 6 
every village elder knows?" E. Jenks, A Short History of English Law 
3-4 (2d ed. 1922). 
6 By the statute 35 Hen. 8, ch. 6 (1543), the judge was empowered to 
award a "tales de circumstantibus, of persons present in court, to be joined 
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The presumptive openness of the jury selection process in 
England, not surprisingly, carried over into proceedings in 
colonial America. For example, several accounts noted the 
need for talesmen at the trials of Thomas Preston and Wil-
liam Wemms, two of the British soldiers who were charged 
with murder after the so-called Boston Massacre in 1770.7 
Public jury selection thus was the common practice in Amer-
ica when the Constitution was adopted. 
B 
For present purposes, how we allocate the "right" to open-
ness as between the accused and the public, or whether we 
view it as a component inherent in the system benefitting 
both, is not crucial. No right ranks higher than the right of 
the accused to a fair trial. But the primacy of the accused's 
right is difficult to separate from the right of everyone in the 
community to attend the voir dire which promotes fairness. 
The open trial thus plays as important a role in the admin-
istration of justice today as it did for centuries before our 
separation from England. The value of openness lies in the 
fact that people not actually attending trials can have confi-
dence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure 
knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that 
established procedures are being followed and that deviations 
will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic 
fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness 
so essential to public confidence in the system. 
to the other jurors to try the cause." 3 W. Blackstone, supra, at 365. If 
the judge issued such a writ, the sheriff brought forward "talesmen" from 
among the bystanders in the courtroom. These talesmen were then sub-
ject to the same challenges as the others. 
7 3 Legal Papers of John Adams 18 (1965) (quoting William Palfrey to 
John Wilkes, Oct. 1770, in Elsey, "John Wilkes and William Palfrey," 34 
Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 411, 423-425 (1943)); id., at 49 n. 9 (quoting Acting 
Governor Thomas Hutchinson in C. B. Mayo ed., Additions to Hutchin-
son's History 32); id., at 100. 
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Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S., at 
569-571. 
This openness has what is sometimes described as a "com-
munity therapeutic value." Id., at 570. Criminal acts, es-
pecially violent crimes, often provoke public concern, even 
outrage and hostility; this in turn generates a community 
urge to retaliate and desire to have justice done. See T. 
Reik, The Compulsion to Confess ~295, 408 (1959). 
Whether this is viewed as retribution or otherwise is irrele-
vant. When the public is aware that the law is being en-
forced and the criminal justice system is functioning, an 
outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and 
emotions. Proceedings held in secret would deny this outlet 
and frustrate the broad public interest; by contrast, public 
proceedings vindicate the concerns of the victims and the 
community in knowing that offenders are being brought to 
account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly 
selected. See United States v. Hasting, --U.S. --, 
-- (1983); Morris v. Slappy, --U.S.--,-- (1983). 
"People in an open society do not demand infallibility from 
their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what 
they are prohibited from observing." Richmond Newspa-
pers, supra, at 572. Closed proceedings, although not abso-
lutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that 
outweighs the value of openness.8 In Globe Newspaper Co. , 
v. Superior Court, 457 U. S. 596 (1982), we stated that: 
8 That for certain purposes, e. g., double jeopardy, a trial begins when 
the first witness, Wade v. Hunter, 366 U. S. 684, 688 (1949), or the jurors, 
Downum v. United States, 372 U. S. 734 (1963), are sworn does not bear 
on the question presented here. The rules of attachment of jeopardy rep-
resent the broad perception that the Government's action has reached the 
point where its power to retrace its steps must be checked by the "counter-
vailing interests of the individual protected by the double jeopardy clause 
of the Fifth Amendment." United States v. Velazquez, 490 F. 2d 29, 34 
(CA2 1973); accord United States v. Jorn, 400 U. S. 470, 480 (1971). By 
contrast, the question we address-whether the voir dire process must be 
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"[T]he circumstances under which the press and public 
can be barred from a criminal trial are limited; the 
State's justification in denying access must be a weighty 
one. Where ... the State attempts to deny the right of 
access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive in-
formation, it must be shown that the denial is necessi-
tated by a compelling governmental interest, and is nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest." I d., at 606-607. 
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an 
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential 
to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with 
findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine 
whether the closure order was properly entered. We now 
turn to whether the presumption of openness has been rebut-
ted in this case. · 
III 
Although three days of voir dire in this case were open to 
the public, six weeks of the proceedings were closed, and me-
dia requests for the transcript were denied. 9 The Superior 
Court asserted two interests in support of its closure order 
and orders denying a transcript: the right of the defendant to 
a fair trial, and the right to privacy of the prospective jurors, 
for any whose "special experiences in sensitive areas ... do 
not appear to be appropriate for public discussion." Supra, 
at --. Of course the right of an accused to fundamental 
fairness in the jury selection process is a compelling interest. I 
open-focuses on First, rather than Fifth, Amendment values and the his-
torical backdrop against which the First Amendment was enacted. 
9 We cannot fail to observe that a voir dire process of such length, in and 
of itself undermines public confidence in the courts and the legal profes-
sion. The process is to ensure a fair impartial jury, not a favorable one. 
Judges, not advocates, must control that process to make sure privileges 
are not so abused. Properly conducted it is inconceivable that the process 
could extend over such a period. We note, however, that in response to 
questions counsel stated that it is not unknown in California courts for jury 
selection to extend six months. 
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But the California court's conclusion that Sixth Amendment 
and privacy interests were sufficient to warrant prolonged 
closure was unsupported by findings showing that an open 
proceeding in fact threatened those interests; 10 hence it is not 
possible to conclude that closure was warranted. 11 Even I 
with findings adequate to support closure, the trial court's or-
ders denying access to voir dire testimony failed to consider 
whether alternatives were available to protect the interests 
of the prospective jurors that the trial court's orders sought 
to guard. Absent consideration of alternatives to closure, 
the trial court could not constitutionally close the voir dire. 
give rise to a compelling interest of the prospective jurors ()/ 
The jury selection process may, in some circumstances~ 
when interrogation touches on deeply personal matters that 
10 We have previously noted that in some limited circumstances, closure 
may be warranted. Thus a trial judge may, ''in the interest of the fair ad-
ministration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial. 
'[T]he question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as 
not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge . . . the opportunities for the com-
munication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially 
associated with resort to public places."' Richmond Newspapers, 448 
U. S., at 555 n. 18 (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941)). 
11 Petitioner contends that respondent's closure order was based on the 
requirement in Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 80, 616 P. 2d 1301 
(1980), that jurors answer voir dire questions concerning juror death quali-
fications "outside the presence of ... fellow venirepersons." The docket 
sheet merely states, however, that petitioner's motion to be admitted to 
jury voir dire "is denied and granted in part, as stated on the record." 
The transcript of hearing on the motion is unenlightening on this score. 
See App. 93. Thus, it is not clear that the judge's ruling was based on ,. 
Hovey. 
Assuming that Hovey was the basis for the trial court's order, it is un-
clear that the interests Hovey sought to protect could have justified re-
spondent's closure order. In Hovey, the California Supreme Court fo-
cused on studies that indicated that jurors were prejudiced by the answers 
of other jurors during voir dire. There was no indication that the presence 
of the public or press affected jurors. The California Supreme Court in 
fact stated that its decision would not "in any way affect the open nature of 
a trial." 28 Cal. 3d, at 80-81. 
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person has legitimate reasons for keeping out of the public 1 
domain. The trial involved testimony concerning an alleged 
rape of a teenage girl. Some questions may have been ap-
propriate to prospective jurors that would give rise to legiti-
mate privacy interests of those persons. For example a pro-
spective juror might privately inform the judge that she, or a 
member of her family, had been raped but had declined to 
seek prosecution because of the embarassment and emotional 
trauma from the very disclosure of the episode. The privacy 
interests of such a prospective juror must be balanced \ 
against the historic values we have discussed and the need 
for opennessof the process. 
To preserve fairness and at the same time protect legiti-
mate privacy, a trial judge must at all times maintain control 
of the process of jury selection and should inform the array of 
prospective jurors, once the general nature of sensitive ques-
tions is made known to them, that those individuals believing 
public questioning will prove damaging because of 
embarassment, may properly request an opportunity to 
present the problem to the judge in camera but with counsel 
present and on the record. 
By requiring the prospective juror to make an affirmative 
request, the trial judge can ensure that there is in fact a valid 
basis for a belief that disclosure infringes a significant inter-
est in privacy. This process will minimize the risk of un-
necessary closure. The exercise of sound discretion by the 
court may lead to excusing such a person from jury service. 
When limited closure is ordered, the constitutional values 
sought to be protected by holding open proceedings may be 
satisfied later by making a transcript of the closed proceed-
ings available within a reasonable time, if the judge deter-
mines that disclosure can be accomplished while safeguarding 
the juror's valid privacy interests. Even then a valid pri-
vacy right may rise to a level that part of the transcript 
should be sealed, or the name of a juror withheld, to protect 
the person from embarassment. 
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The judge at this trial closed an incredible six weeks of voir 
dire without considering alternatives to closure. Later the 
court declined to release a transcript of the voir dire even 
while stating that "most of the information" in the transcript 
was "dull and boring." Supra, at --. Those parts of the j 
transcript reasonably entitled to privacy could have been 
sealed without such a sweeping order; a trial judge should ex-
plain why the material is entitled to privacy.-
Assuming that some jurors had protectible privacy inter-
ests in some of their answers, the trial judge provided no ex-
planation why his broad order denying access to information 
at the voir dire was not limited to information that was actu-
ally sensitive and deserving of privacy protection. Nor did 
he consider whether he could disclose the substance of the 
sensitive answers while preserving the anonymity of the ju-
rors involved. 
Thus not only was there a failure to articulate :findings with 
the requisite specificity but there was also a failure to con-
sider alternatives to closure and to total suppression of the 
transcript. The trial judge should seal only such parts of the 
transcript as necessary to preserve the ieeatity of the indi- o.V\oV\y"""-;+l' 
viduals sought to be protected. 
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is vacated, and the 
case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this 
op1mon. 
It is so ordered. 
l 
January 6, 1984 
82-556 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court 
Dear Chi.ef: 
Please join me in the 2nd draft of your opinion for the 
Court. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
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practices that affect the administration of justice. 
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